University of Miami Law Review
Volume 29

Number 3

Article 11

5-1-1975

NLRB Policymaking: The Rulemaking-Adjudication Dilemma
Revisited in NLRB V. Bell Aerospace Co.
George W. Chesrow

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
George W. Chesrow, NLRB Policymaking: The Rulemaking-Adjudication Dilemma Revisited in NLRB V. Bell
Aerospace Co., 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 559 (1975)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol29/iss3/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

COMMENTS
NLRB POLICYMAKING: THE RULEMAKING-

ADJUDICATION DILEMMA REVISITED IN
NLRB v. BELL AEROSPACE CO.
GEORGE W.
I.

II.
III.
IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................
BACKGROUND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN Bell Aerospace ...........

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN Bell Aerospace ..........................
THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE ...........................................
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE Bell Aerospace DECISIONS ......

A.
B.
C.
V I.

CHESROW*

The Advantages of Rulemaking ..........................................
The Agency's Need for Autonomy ........................................
Standardsfor Judicial Review of an Agency's Choice Between Rulemaking and
A djudication ..........................................................

CON CLU SION ............

..................................................

I.

559
561
567
568

570
570
574
578
582

INTRODUCTION

Policymaking is a vital function of an administrative agency. In
general, administrative law is primarily a process of policymaking in
the administration of legislative authority delegated to the agency in
order to enable it to govern a particular sector of society which
Congress has recognized as requiring regulation. The substantive law
advanced by an administrative agency provides the contents of administrative policy. Persons who are subject to agency regulation
manage their affairs and guide their conduct in society according to the
agency's pronounced policy.I
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 provides that an ad3
ministrative agency may formulate policy either through rulemaking
4
or through case-by-case adjudication. The APA, while it provides a
* Member of the Editorial Board and Casenote Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See generally L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-32 (3d ed. 1968).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).

3. "Rule making" is defined as an "agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1970). A rule "means the whole or part of an agency statement of general

or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy.
... 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
Rulemaking procedures include publication in the Federal Register of general notice of the
proposed rulemaking and hearing; an opportunity for interested persons to participate in the
rulemaking through the submission of written data, views or arguments with or without an
opportunity for oral presentation; a statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule; and
publication in the Federal Register of the rule as adopted. S U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
4. The APA defines "adjudication" as an "agency process for the formulation of an order." 5
U.S.C. § 551(7) (1970). An "order" means "the whole or part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than
rulemaking but including licensing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
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choice of procedures, offers no guidelines to the agency for determining
how and under what conditions rulemaking should be used rather than
adjudication or vice versa.'
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bell
Aerospace Co. v. NLRB 6 boldly asserted that in reviewing an agency's
decision to formulate policy, courts are lodged with the power to make
a procedural choice between rulemaking or adjudicatory procedures
for the agency and may compel the agency to proceed by that choice in
carrying out its policymaking responsibilities.
The assumption by the court of appeals of the power to direct an
agency to conduct a rulemaking proceeding against the agency's decision to proceed by adjudicatory procedures has far-reaching implications. Central to the decision are the propositions that: (1) there are
situations where the advantages of proceeding by rulemaking rather
than by case-by-case adjudication are so substantial that a court
should be allowed to substitute its judgment in place of the agency's
exercise of discretion; (2) greater value should be placed on the advantages of rulemaking procedures than the agency's need for autonomy in
deciding whether to announce rules in an adjudication or promulgate
formal rules; and (3) given the advantages of rulemaking, there are
standards a court can apply in determining when an agency should be
compelled to use one procedure to the exclusion of the other.
Until Chief Judge Friendly's pioneer efforts in Bell Aerospace7 to
require the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to make policy
changes through the use of rulemaking, the settled response of the
judiciary had been to let an agency exercise its informed discretion in
choosing between rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures. 8 Bell
Aerospace is a frontier decision because it proposed to introduce a legal
concept into the field of administrative procedure, thereby offering a
broad scope for judicial activity in determining how an agency should
choose among available procedures.
The decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 9 The court of appeals' attempted
departure from settled law into an area whose limits were largely unknown came to a halt-at least temporarily. The decision of the Supreme
Court does not completely rule out the possibility that an agency may be
compelled to conduct a rulemaking proceeding in order to enunciate its
policy. This article will examine the Bell Aerospace decisions and the
5. The definitions of rulemaking and adjudication provided by the APA are not very helpful
in this respect. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 610 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein];
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy,
78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
6. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Bell Aerospace].
7. id.
8. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) [hereinafter referred to as Chenery].
9. 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.].
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ramifications of judicial interference with an agency's discretion to
choose between rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures.

II.

BACKGROUND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION IN BELL AEROSPACE

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes
the "rights of employees" to join labor organizations and to engage in
collective bargaining through their chosen representatives.' 0 These
rights are protected by section 8(a) of the Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7." 11 Whether a particular employee is entitled to the benefit of section
7 rights and section 8(a) protections from unfair labor practices depends upon the statutory definition of an "employee.' 1 2 Since the
definition of an "employee" determines which persons are included or
excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, the
scope of the Act's coverage can be expanded or contracted by the way
in which the definition is interpreted.
The National Labor Relations Act defines the term "employee"
broadly to include "any employee.' 1 3 In 1947 the meaning of the term
was narrowed by the Taft-Hartley amendments which excepted
"supervisors" as defined by Congress. 14 The term "managerial
employee!' is neither mentioned nor in any way defined by the National Labor Relations Act; rather, it is a concept created by the
National Labor Relations Board for the primary purpose of deciding in
representation cases "whether certain non-supervisory employees have
a sufficient community of interest with the general group or class of
employees constituting the bulk of a unit so that they may appropriately be considered a part thereof.' 5 The Board never clearly
defined "managerial employee" because the concept only had utility as
a functional tool by which the community of interest between different
10. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
13. The term "employee" does not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the
Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
14. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 138 (1947). Section 2(11) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), now provides:
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward,
or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment.
15. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
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categories of employees could be assessed in determining the appropriateness of a proposed bargaining unit.16 The concept was developed by the NLRB through case-by-case adjudications. 1 7 For years
the customary practice of the Board was to determine from the facts
of each representation case whether a particular employee was more
closely allied with management than with his fellow employees and
therefore lacked a community of interest sufficient to warrant inclusion
in a bargaining unit consisting of his fellow employees. '8 A variety of
loosely defined criteria evolved for the purpose of analyzing the facts
of each case. The usual method employed in assessing community of
interest was to determine whether the employee exercised managerial
prerogatives in the formulation or effectuation of his employer's
policies, and if so, the amount of discretion available to the employee
in carrying out* the employer's policies. These standards, although
general in nature, were applied to specific factual questions in representation cases. 19
In Bell Aerospace Co., 20 a representation case, the National Labor
Relations Board found that 25 buyers employed in Bell Aerospace
Company's purchasing and procurement department constituted an
appropriate unit for bargaining and directed an election. The buyers
voted in favor of union representation.
Relying upon prior Board decisions holding that buyers were
managerial employees and, as such, not entitled to the section 7 rights
of joining labor organizations and bargaining collectively through representatives, 2 ' Bell (the company) refused to recognize the union.
16. In North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), the Board
explained its policy on managerial employees:
Where the interests of certain employees seemed to lie more with those persons who
formulate, determine, and oversee company policy than with those in the proposed unit
who merely carry out the resultant policy, we have held them to be excluded [from the
general group of employees], and have commonly referred to such excluded persons as
"managerial employees," without ever having attempted a precise definition of that
term.
17. Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944), appears to be the first representation case in which buyers were excluded from a unit of clerical employees because "their duties
are closely allied to management, differing materially from those of the other clerical employees."
In Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733 (1944), a buyer was excluded from a unit of production
employees as a managerial employee.
Because of the responsibility of his position and his peculiar relationship to management, and in view of the fact that his interests are apparently different from those of the
production and maintenance employees, we shall exclude him.
Id. at 736.
18. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
19. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 NL.R.B. 550 (1970). See note 16 supra.
20. 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), motion for reconsiderationdenied, 196 N.L.R.B. 827 (1972).

The facts in the representation case were not in dispute.
21. In Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956), the Board held that procurement drivers,
whose job responsibilities included buying supplies for their employer, could neither be included
in a unit of production and maintenance employees nor in a separate unit consisting exclusively of
procurement drivers. In excluding the drivers from exercising bargaining rights under the
National Labor Relations Act, the Board concluded:
It was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all
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Spurred by a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 22 which was
handed down contemporaneously with the Board's certification of the
buyers at Bell Aerospace Company and which held that managerial
employees are not entitled to the protections accorded to "employees"

by the NLRA, 23 Bell decided to challenge the authority of the Board
to accord collective bargaining rights to the 25 buyers which the
company employed.
The buyers employed by Bell Aerospace Company purchased all of
the company's needs. They had full discretion without any dollar
limit in selecting prospective vendors, preparing invitations to bids,
assessing the bids which were submitted, and preparing purchase orders. The buyers had complete authority to make purchases on their
own signature up to $5000 in any transaction; however, they had to
obtain approval from management superiors in order to make commitments of Bell's funds in excess of $5000.24 In addition to negotiating the terms and prices of contracts, the buyers were responsible for
monitoring the performance of the contracts and adjusting disputes
which might arise between Bell Aerospace Company and the suppliers. 25
The dispute in the representation case concerned the legal standards to be applied to the facts by the Board in deciding whether the
individuals allied with management. Such individuals cannot be deemed to be
employees for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, we reaffirm the Board's position
that representatives of management may not be accorded bargaining rights under the
Act ....
Id. at 753-54.
The Board also refused to certify a separate unit of buyers in American Locomotive Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 115, 117 (1950), where it stated that "[a]s it appears that the buyers are authorized to
make substantial purchases for the Employer, we find that they are representatives of management, and as such may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act."
In numerous other representation cases the Board also excluded buyers from rank and file
units of employees. Interstate Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 101, 106 (1959) ("In accordance with customary
Board policy, we will exclude these employees as managerial employees because of their buying
function."); Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1089 (1958) ("Buyer A: This [employee]
purchases materials for the company and is often required to pledge the company's credit. We
find that Buyer A is managerial, and exclude him from the unit."); Denton's Inc., 83 N.L.R.B.
35, 37 (1949) ("the interests of the buyers . . . are more closely identified with management than
with the other employees .. . in accordance with our policy ... we shall exclude all buyers . ..').
The rule of Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956), that "[i]t was the clear intent of
Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all individuals allied with management," was
described by the Board in its brief to the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. as a
"sweeping and inaccurate statement" that was contrary
to numerous Board decisions immediately after the enactment of the 1947 amendments
which held that managerial employees, not presenting a conflict of interest problem,
were to be excluded from rank-and-file bargaining units, but not from the coverage of
the Act.
Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 27, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757
(1974).
22. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as North Arkansas].
23. Id. at 610.
24. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1760 (1974).
25. Brief for Bell Aerospace Co. at 3, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
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buyers were managerial employees, and if so, whether they were
entitled to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA. The
Board never clearly ruled on the narrow issue of whether Bell's buyers
were managerial employees; 2 6 for the Board decided that even though
the buyers might be managerial employees, they were entitled to be
represented under the Act, 2 7 thus relying upon its then recent decision
in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc. 28 In North Arkansas, the
Board, reversing several long standing decisions, 29 found that with
certain limitations, managerial employees are employees within the
meaning of the Act and are entitled to its protection. Under previous
Board decisions, managerial employees had been excluded from the
30
protections of the NLRA.
North Arkansas was an unfair labor practice case in which an
employer was ordered to reinstate with back pay a managerial
employee who had been discharged for failing to remain neutral as
requested by his employer during a union campaign. The Board in
North Arkansas had originally ordered reinstatement on the theory
that the discharged employee was not a managerial employee. 3 1 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in its first decision in NLRB v.
North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc. 32 held that the employee
had managerial status and remanded the case to the Board "with
specific instructions to it to determine whether or not the discharge of
Lenox [the employee], as a 'managerial employee' under all the
cir33
cumstances of the case, was or was not violative of the Act.")
In a supplemental decision, the Board in North Arkansas Electric
Cooperative, Inc. 34 again ordered the reinstatement of the managerial
employee and ruled for the first time that most managerial employees
are entitled to the protections of the Act. Prior to this decision, the
Board had applied two judicially discernible criteria in determining
whether an employee was a managerial employee and, therefore, not
entitled to the rights accorded to "employees" by section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act. These criteria had been created and
applied by the Board in determining whether an employee was properly classifiable as a managerial employee and, as such, lacked the
requisite community of interest necessary for inclusion in a unit of
26. Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 n.2 (1971); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94
S. Ct. 1757, 1760 n.2 (1974).
27. Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971).
28. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
29. Insofar as Swift & Company . . . and other cases have indicated, in a representation
case context, that managerial employees might not be entitled to the protection of the
Act, we hereby overrule them to the extent that they may be inconsistent with our
decision herein.
North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 n.8 (1970). See note 21 supra.
30. See note 21 supra and cases cited therein.
31. 168 N.L.R.B. 921, 924 (1967).
32. 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 328.
34. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
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rank-and-file employees. The Board itself had never clearly defined
these criteria. 35 The various courts of appeals, however, in reviewing
both representation cases 3 6 and unfair labor practice cases 37 had found
that the following tests were customarily applied by the Board in
defining managerial employees:
The first test is to determine whether an employee is so
closely related to or aligned with management as to place the
employee in a position of potential conflict of interest between
his employer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the
other. If an employee is found to be in such a position, he is
not, under Board policy, entitled to be represented in the
collective process.
The second managerial employee test is to determine
whether the employee is formulating, determining and effectuating his employer's policies or has discretion, independent
of an employer's established policy, in the performance of his
duties. If an employer cloaks an individual with such authority or such discretion, that individual would be a managerial
employee and would be deprived
of the right of representa38
tion by a bargaining unit.
Prior to North Arkansas, all employees classifiable as managerial
employees had been denied section 7 rights and section 8(a) protections. 39 In North Arkansas, the Board not only determined that some
managerial employees should be afforded coverage under the Act, but
also changed the applicable criteria in determining which managerial
employees were to be covered by the Act and which were not. The first
test was retained unchanged. The second test, which is much more
functional than the first, was altered. 4 0 Under the new North Arkansas
35. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
36. A finding by the Board's Regional Director that district circulation managers, whose
responsibilities included overseeing the distribution of newspapers, "were not supervisory or
managerial employees and that they constituted a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Act" was reviewed in Illinois State Journal Register,
Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 39 (7th Cir. 1969), under section 10(f) of the National Labor
Relations Act in the context of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5). These sections concern unfair labor
practices caused by the employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the representative chosen
by the circulation managers. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th
Cir. 1970); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir.
1964).
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir.
1971); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Illinois State Journal Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969). On
several occasions the Board has been admonished for not having "developed clear standards for
determining what is a managerial employee." Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642,
644 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116,
123 (2d Cir. 1964), the court noted that "the Board's rulings on the scope of this definition are not
a model of clarity .... " The Board in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B.
550 (1970), responded to the judicial criticism by explaining that "[t]his lack of definition may be
inherent in the difficult process which we face constantly in evaluating 'community of interest' in
many kinds of unit determinations."
39. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1768 (1974).
40. The likelihood of a potential conflict of interest and the closeness of the relationship
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test, the emphasis was no longer on the employee's discretion in
carrying out the employer's general policies, but on the employee's
participation "in the formulation, determination, ' 'aorl effectuation of
policy with respect to employee relations matters.
If the managerial employee had such discretion, he would be
excluded from the coverage of the Act because his duties would be
likely to cause a conflict of interest between his job responsibilities and
his responsibilities to a labor organization arising from his participation in a union. However, if no conflict of interest was likely to arise
because the managerial employee was not involved in formulating or
implementing labor relations policies, then even though the managerial
employee had substantial discretion in formulating, determining and
effectuating his employer's other policies and would have been
excluded from the Act's protection under the original second test as a
managerial employee, he was entitled to coverage under the new
North Arkansas test.
Having overturned prior decisions holding that all managerial
employees are excluded from the coverage of the Act 4 2 and deciding in
North Arkansas that only those managerial employees who participate
in the formulation or effectuation of management policy with respect
to employee relations matters are to be excluded from the coverage of
the Act, th-e Board then decided to apply the North Arkansas ruling to
a representation proceeding. Bell Aerospace Co. was the first represen-.
tation proceeding in which the Board held that managerial employees
are entitled to representation rights under the National Labor Relations Act. 43 However, on the same day that the Board certified the 25
buyers at Bell as an appropriate unit for the purpose of engaging in
collective bargaining, 4 a second decision was rendered by the Eighth
Circuit in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.4 5 In that decision, the court refused to enforce the order directing the employer to
reinstate the managerial employee who had been discharged for his
union activities and held that managerial employees are not covered by
the National Labor Relations Act and, therefore, are not entitled to its
46
protections.
Bell sought reconsideration of the Board's decision to certify the
unit of buyers since the Eighth Circuit in its second decision in North
Arkansas had rejected the Board's new approach in determining the
between the employee and management will depend in many cases on the amount of discretion
entrusted to the employee in formulating and effectuating his employer's policies.
41. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1970) (emphasis in
original).
42. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115
(1950). See note 21 supra.
43. 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971). See 36 NLRB ANN. REP. 41 (1972); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1768 n.14 (1974).
44. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1760 n.3 (1974).
45. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 610.
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coverage to be extended to managerial employees under the NLRA.
Bell Aerospace Company's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Board 47 and its next forum for relief was the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN BELL
AEROSPACE

The court of appeals followed the Eighth Circuit's second decision in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc. n8 and held
that "true 'managerial employees' " are not covered by the NLRA. 4 9
The court reached this conclusion based upon its reading of several
Board decisions which bluntly stated that managerial employees could
not be deemed employees for the purpose of the NLRA. 50 The court
of appeals was particularly alert to the reaction of Congress in overturning the holdings of the Packard Motor Co. 5 decisions that supervisory employees constituted an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. The Taft-Hartley amendments expressly excluded supervisors
from the definition of "employee" and, therefore, the protections afforded to employees. 5 2 Although the definition of supervisors written
into the NLRA by the Taft-Hartley amendments does not encompass
managerial employees, the court of appeals reasoned that Congress
nevertheless intended to impliedly exclude them from the coverage of
the Act's protection. 5 3 "Congress recognized there were other persons
so much more clearly managerial [than supervisors] that it was inconceivable that the Board would treat them as employees."'5 4 The court
futher reasoned that the Board's settled policy was to exclude managerial employees from units of rank-and-file employees. Therefore, a
specific provision expressly excluding managerial employees was
deemed unnecessary by Congress since presumably the Board would
continue to exclude them from rank-and-file units and logically from
separate units consisting exclusively of managerial employees. 55 The
court of appeals concluded that although the Board had consistently
excluded buyers as managerial employees from rank-and-file units of
employees and had in several instances refused to certify separate units
consisting exclusively of buyers,
47. Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827 (1972).
48. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
49. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 494 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 492-94.
51. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), aff'g Packard Motor Car Co., 64
N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945). The Packard decisions raised the question of how far unionization should
reach into the industrial hierarchy. In a dissenting opinion in Packard, Justice Douglas stated
that "[t]he present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line between management and labor."
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947).

52. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
53. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1973).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 492-94.
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we do not think the Board would be precluded, on proper
proceedings, from determining that buyers, or some types of
buyers, are not true "managerial employees" and consequently come within the protection of § 8(a)(5) and (1).56
The "proper proceeding" which the court of appeals was referring to
was a rulemaking proceeding which the NLRA specifically authorizes
the Board to conduct.5 7 The court decided that if the Board were to
reverse its policy and hold that buyers are not managerial employees,
then in so doing, it could no longer disregard, as it had done for a
quarter century, the Supreme Court's admonition to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the second SEC v. Chenery Corp. decision:
"The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future."5 8 In support of his position,
Judge Friendly also referred to dicta in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.:
Either the rule-making provisions are to be enforced or they
are not. Before the Board may be permitted to adopt a rule
that so significantly alters pre-existing labor-management understandings, it must be required to conduct a satisfactory
rule-making proceeding, so that it will have the benefit of
wide-ranging argument before
it enacts its proposed solution
59
to an important problem.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE

The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and
reversed in part by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
C0. 60 The Supreme Court in a five to four decision agreed with the
Second Circuit that all employees who are properly classified as "managerial" must be excluded from the coverage of the NLRA. 61 In
rejecting the position of the Board that managerial employees should
be excluded from the Act's protection only in those situations where
their duties to their employer include formulating or implementing
labor relations policies, the majority opinion determined that the
Board had applied an improper legal standard in defining who is a
managerial employee. 62 The Court remanded to "permit the Board to
56. Id. at 494.
57. Section 6 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970), provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the
manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.
58. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
59. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 781 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 598 et seq.
60. 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
61. Id. at 1762. Justice White, who wrote the dissenting opinion, argued that "managerial
employees" are literally within the NLRA's definition of an "employee" as provided in 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1970). For an analysis of Justice White's dissenting opinion, see The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 258, 262 (1974).
62. 94 S. Ct. at 1769; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943).
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apply the proper legal standard in determining the status" of the
buyers at Bell. 6 3 The Court noted that the question whether the buyers
are managerial employees "must be answered in terms of the
employees' actual job responsibilities, authority and relationship to
management, '64 although the Board could also consider the possibility
that the participation of buyers in a labor organization would lead to
65
a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities.
The Supreme Court further held that "the Board is not precluded
from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and
that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first
'
instance within the Board's discretion. "66
All nine Justices agreed on
this point. In deciding that the National Labor Relations Board could
not judicially be compelled to proceed by rulemaking rather than by
adjudication in announcing a policy change, the Court reaffirmed its
holding in SEC v. Chenery Corp. 67 Chenery established the cardinal
principle of administrative procedure that "the choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.'"68

The discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication
was returned to the Board after the aggressive initiative of the court
of appeals to confine the Board's freedom of choice. The Board
however, may not have recovered all that it would have lost had the
Supreme Court fully sustained the Second Circuit's decision in Bell
Aerospace. The Supreme Court's decision plainly gives warning that
"there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication
would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act
.... ,"69 An exception to the Board's free exercise of its discretion in
choosing to adjudicate rather than proceed by rulemaking may arise:
(1) where industry reliance on past decisions of the Board results in
substantial "adverse consequences," (2) where the Board seeks to impose new liability on individuals "for past actions which were taken in
good faith reliance on Board pronouncements," or (3) where fines or
damages are imposed for the violation of Board policy newly announced in an adjudication. 70 Provided that the agency does not run
63.
64.
65.
66.

94 S. Ct. at 1769.
Id. at n.19.
Id. at n.20.
Id. at 1771.

67. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

68. Id. at 203.
69. 94 S. Ct. at 1771.
70. Id.at 1772. The Supreme Court is not breaking new ground in stating that the use of
adjudicatory procedures may amount to an abuse of discretion.
In NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952), the employer entered into a
closed shop agreement with a union at a time when the Board had refused to take jurisdiction in
cases involving the construction industry. The Board reversed its policy in taking jurisdiction
over the construction industry and retroactively determined that the employer was guilty of an
unfair labor practice for dismissing an employee who had been discharged from the union for
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afoul of the narrow instances in which the Court, by way of dictum,
indicated that the use of the adjudicatory procedures may amount to
an abuse of discretion, its freedom to choose between proceeding by
rulemaking or by adjudication remains untrammeled.
V.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

OF THE

BELL AEROSPACE DECISIONS

At the outset of this article the suggestion was made that there are
at least three premises inherent in the court of appeals decision in Bell
Aerospace. These postulates are suggested in order to explain the
practical meaning and potential precedential value of the Bell decisions. First, there may be situations where the perceived advantages of
proceeding by rulemaking are so substantial that the process of judicial
review of agency action should be expanded to allow a court to
substitute its judgment in place of the agency's exercise of discretion in
choosing among available procedures. Second, it can be inferred that
greater value should be placed on the advantages of rulemaking procedures than the agency's need for autonomy in deciding whether to
announce rules in an adjudication or promulgate formal rules. Third,
judicial compulsion and interference with an agency's discretion to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication implies, and possibly
assumes, that there are clearly definable standards which a court can
apply to the determination. The three premises can serve as useful
analytical tools in explaining how the court of appeals reached the
conclusion that the Board could determine that buyers are not managerial employees only by invoking its rulemaking procedures. They
are equally helpful in explaining why the Supreme Court reversed and
held that "the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the
'7
first instance within the Board's discretion." '
A.

The Advantages of Rulemaking

In formulating policy, choices must be made among alternative
and competing courses of action. If the agency is to choose the best
alternative among competing policies, it must be equipped with procedures which will enable it to marshal all of the relevant information
upon which its decision must be based. 7 2 In recent years attention has
failing to pay his dues. The Board awarded the employee back pay. The Court of Appeals
refused enforcement because the Board abused its discretion in retroactively changing its policy in
an adjudication.
We think it apparent that the practical operation of the Board's change of policy,
when incorporated in the order now before us, is to work hardship upon respondent
altogether out of proportion to the public ends to be accomplished. The inequity of such
an impact of retroactive policy making upon a respondent innocent of any conscious
violation of the act, and who was unable to know, when it acted, that it was guilty of
any conduct of which the Board would take cognizance, is manifest. It is the sort of
thing our system of law abhors.
Id. at 149. See also NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1966).
71. 94 S. Ct. at 1771.
72. Professor Davis describes rulemaking as
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been focused on the manner in which an agency proceeds to exercise
its authority to make policy. 73 This focus on procedure is due to an
increasing demand for greater participation in the process of
74
policymaking.
One of the advantages of rulemaking is that it provides an agency
with procedures which free it from having to mold a rule of law only
in the context of the adversarial interests which are likely to be
represented in an adjudicative proceeding. 75 In rulemaking, the
agency is acting more like a legislature than a court. 76 As a quasilegislative body, it can, under section 553 of the APA, 77 look beyond
the confines of a record in making policy. 78 The informal notice and
comment provisions allow any interested person an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking proceeding by submitting information in
written form, with an opportunity for oral presentations at the agen79
cy's discretion.
In the Bell Aerospace decision, the court of appeals, in what has
been called "[p]robably the most innovative decision of late,"8 0 determined that the National Labor Relations Board must engage in a
one of the greatest inventions of modern government. . . .[Aiffected parties who know
facts that the agency may not know or who have ideas or understanding that the agency
may not share have opportunity by quick and easy means to transmit the facts, ideas, or
understanding to the agency at the crucial time when the agency's positions are still
fluid.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
73 See generally Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 371 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Bernstein, supra note 5; Boyer, Alternatives to
Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social
Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Boyer]; Fuchs, Agency Development of
Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 781 (1965); Peck, A Critique of the National
Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, supra note 5.
74. "Adjudication procedure is undemocratic to the extent that it allows creation of policy
affecting many unrepresented parties." DAVIS, supra note 72, at 142.
75. See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 596; Shapiro, supra note 5, at 930-32.
76. See generally DAVIS, supra note 72, at 139-43; Shapiro, supra note 5, at 932.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
78. The Administrative Procedure Act recognizes two types of rulemaking which must be
distinguished. Informal rulemaking requires only notice and an opportunity for interested persons
"to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). Formal rulemaking is a
method of rulemaking using the adjudicatory, trial-type hearings specified in sections 556 and 557
of the APA. Formal rulemaking is required "[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). See United States
v. Florida E.C. Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742 (1972); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally J. Skelly Wright,
Court of Appeals Review of FederalRegulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. REV. 199 (1974); J.
Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
80. J. Skelly Wright, Court of Appeals Review of FederalRegulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26
AD. L. REV. 199, 202 (1974).
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rulemaking proceeding when it proposes to reverse "a long-standing
81
and oft-repeated policy on which industry and labor have relied."
The decision, written by Chief Judge Friendly, was based upon two
imperatives of policymaking: (1) the requirement that an opportunity
to participate in the change of agency policy be afforded to industry
and labor organizations; and (2) and obligation that the agency have "all
available information" before changing its policy. 82 Judge Friendly

focused his concern on the substantial impact that a change in Board
policy would have on those regulated by agency policy. "There must
be tens of thousands of manufacturing, wholesale and retail units
83
which employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter."
There is widespread agreement among courts and commentators
that greater participation of regulated constituents and increased informational inputs will greatly enhance an agency's process of promulgating policy. 84 Rulemaking procedures can provide the vehicle to

achieve these goals. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. recognized that reasons do exist for greater use of rulemaking by
the Board. "[R]ulemaking would provide the Board with a forum for
soliciting the informed view9 of those'85 affected in industry and labor
before embarking on a new course."
The opportunity for widespread participation and the superior
information gathering likely to result from increased participation are
not the only advantages of rulemaking procedures. Rulemaking operates prospectively only. 8 6 Therefore, prior to the enactment of the rule,
the procedures give fair warning to the constituents of an agency as to
how they shall be governed in the future.
In contrast to rulemaking, the usual pattern in an adjudication
where new policy is announced is for the agency to apply its new
policy retroactively to the parties to the adjudication. 87 A retroactive
change in policy can cause hardship to the parties before the agency in
a particular proceeding if they have relied upon a prior agency position
or the absence of any statement of agency policy in governing their
conduct. 8 8 There is always a possibility of hardship because in an
adjudication the agency may adopt a rule for the first time and then,
81. 475 F.2d at 497.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 496.
84. See note 75 supra.
85. 94 S. Ct. at 1772.
86. With few exceptions, an agency must publish a substantive rule in the Federal Register
30 days before its effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1970).
87. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
88. See NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952), discussed at note 70
supra. Presumably an agency has the power to act prospectively in either rulemaking or adjudication. NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1966). However, in NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the Supreme Court admonished the Board for laying
down a rule in an adjudicatory proceeding (Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966))
which was not applied to the parties to the adjudication, but was to have prospective effect only.
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by applying it retroactively, decide that it has been violated by the
very parties who have been singled out by the agency for the applica89
tion of a policymaking change.
9
Both the court of appeals " and the Supreme Court agreed that
the Board's change of policy in certifying a unit consisting exclusively
of buyers did not cause any hardship by exposing the employer to
unexpected liability.
[T]his is not a case in which some new liability is sought to be
imposed on individuals for past actions which were taken in
good faith reliance on Board pronouncements. Nor are fines
or damages involved here. In any event, concern about such
consequences is largely speculative, for the Board has not yet
finally determined whether these buyers are "managerial."'
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court were also in harmony regarding the advantages which rulemaking offers an agency in
performing its policymaking function; however, they differed as to the
weight which should be accorded to them in compelling the Board to
invoke its rulemaking procedures. The Supreme Court resisted acceding to the attractiveness of the position which the decision of the court
of appeals would have established; namely, that the advantages likely
to result from the opportunity which rulemaking provides for greater
participation of affected participants and from the superior information gathering technique provided by informal rulemaking procedures
are so substantial that a court should be allowed to substitute its
judgment when called upon to review the agency's procedural choice.
Judge Friendly noted the fact that the Board in Bell Aerospace
was attempting to change a "long-standing and oft-repeated policy." 92
His insistence on affording greater participation to the agency's constituents when a major policy change is contemplated by the agency
strongly suggests that he believes that by requiring the Board to
proceed by rulemaking, a measure of predictability and accountability
93
can be achieved in the agency's process of making policy.
It would seem that compulsory rulemaking would provide the
constituents of an agency with greater certainty of agency policy than
would adjudicatory procedures. When an agency announces a rule of
law in a formal rulemaking proceeding, it is bound by it unless the rule
89. See Berger, supra note 73; FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8367-68 (1964).
90. 475 F.2d at 497.

91. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1772 (1974).
92. 475 F.2d at 497.

93. Judge Friendly informed the Board of his growing concern over its failure to use
rulemaking in several cases prior to the Bell Aerospace decision. See NLRB v. Penn Cork &
Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854,
860 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion);

NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963).
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is rescinded in a subsequent rulemaking proceeding. 9 4 The agency can
therefore be held accountable to its published rules until formally
repealed; and even then, interested persons can participate in the
rulemaking proceeding in which the agency proposes to change a prior
rule. When an adjudication is the setting for the announcement of a
new agency policy, the agency can rescind or modify the rule in any
subsequent adjudication of its own choosing. 95 The accountability
factor is thus lost. Moreover, the opportunities for widespread participation of potentially affected parties in the adjudication may be
lim96
ited to the agency's willingness to invite amicus curiae briefs.
However, since an agency has both quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers, the accountability factor present when an agency
engages in rulemaking may be more imaginary than real. There is
nothing to prevent an agency from modifying a formal rule through
the process of construction or interpretation. Therefore, even if a
formal rule can be rescinded only in a subsequent rulemaking proceeding, if the agency can, through quasi-judicial interpretation, sidestep
the rule or significantly alter its intended purpose when applying it to a
particular controversy, a formal rule might provide no greater certainty and accountability than an adjudicatory rule.
Although the Supreme Court and the court of appeals were in
substantial agreement that rulemaking procedures do provide advantages not present in an adjudication, they differed as to the weight
which a court should place on the advantages of rulemaking in making
a decision to curb an agency's discretion to choose freely between
rulemaking and adjudication. The reason for the difference may be
found in the value which the Supreme Court placed on the importance
of agency discretion in the functioning of the administrative process of
policymaking.
B.

The Agency's Need for Autonomy

A second premise underlying the court of appeals' decision in
Bell Aerospace is that greater value should be placed on the advantages of rulemaking procedures than on an agency's need for autonomy
in deciding whether to formulate policy through rulemaking or adjudication. Judge Friendly never discussed the possible effects which judicial scrutiny of the type he proposed would have on the administrative
process in general and on the exercise of agency discretion in particular. 97 By establishing that a reviewing court can compel an agency to
94. See Berger, supra note 73, at 377-78.
95. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 947-52. There is always the possibility that the agency's
departure from an adjudicatory rule will be found to be an abuse of discretion. See note 70 supra
and accompanying text.
96. The Board used this technique to solicit the views of "certain interested parties" prior to
its decision in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1238 (1966), which laid down the
rule requiring the employer to furnish a list of eligible voters to be made available to all parties to
a representation election. See genterally Shapiro, supra note 5, at 931.
97. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 565-69 (1965).
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conduct a rulemaking proceeding to announce a change in policy, the
agency's procedural autonomy may be severely restricted. It follows
that to the extent that an agency's choice of proceeding by adjudication
or by rulemaking is subjected to judicial review, the agency's authority
to control and manage the functioning of the administrative process is
diminished.
Limitations may be desirable, however, if fundamental improvements in the operation of an administrative agency can be achieved
only by confining the discretion of an agency. 9 8 The issue which the
decision of the court of appeals in Bell Aerospace raises is whether the
advantages of rulemaking, likely to accrue from greater participation
and from the availability of increased information to the agency, offset
the cost of limiting the Board's discretion and flexibility in announcing
policy through case-by-case adjudications.
The court of appeals neglected to examine the agency's need for
autonomy in deciding whether to develop policy through the adoption
of general rule or through ad hoc adjudications, presumably because
the Board has very rarely, and then only recently, exercised its
rulemaking powers. 99
The Supreme Court, however, was attentive to the necessity of
preserving agency autonomy. Underlying the Court's decision in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. is the concern that the administrative
process, if it is to be effective in carrying out a statutory design, must
be flexible. Adjudication may be necessary to resolve complex problems which require the special attention of the agency and whose
solution cannot be captured within the prescriptions of a rule of
general effect.
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of
a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a
general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular,
unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency
must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. 100
While the decision of the Supreme Court purports to restore agency
discretion, it does not rule out the possibility of judicially imposed
Professor Jaffe suggests "that in the absence of a clear legal prescription, a reasonable procedural
decision should withstand judicial interference." Id. at 567.
98. The multiplication of agencies and their growing power make them more and more
remote from the people affected by what they do and make more likely the arbitraryexercise of their powers. Public airing of problems through rule making makes the
bureaucracy more responsive to public needs and is an important brake on the growth
of absolutism in the regime that now governs all of us.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 778 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495 n.14 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1771 (1974), citing SEC v. Chenery, 332
U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (emphasis in original).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

limitations in some circumstances. The Court's dictum that "there may
be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would
amount to an abuse of discretion"'10 1 suggests such a possibility. Therefore, the second premise inherent in the court of appeals' decision to
require rulemaking-that greater value should be placed on the advantages of rulemaking procedures than on an agency's need for procedural autonomy-was not totally rejected by the Supreme Court.
What the Court rejected was the Second Circuit's contention that the
potential for greater participation and information achievable through
rulemaking is sufficiently substantial to tip the balance in favor of
requiring rulemaking. The Supreme Court placed equal or greater
weight on the agency's interest in preserving the flexibility of the
administrative process, which includes the power to act
quasi10 2
judicially as well as quasi-legislatively in making policy.
However, when the use of adjudicatory procedures causes hardship by exposing a participant in an agency adjudication to new and
unforeseen liability, greater importance will be placed on the availability of rulemaking procedures, with its attendant advantages, than on
the agency's interest in preserving its procedural autonomy. The Supreme Court may very well be broadening the meaning of "abuse of
discretion" and strengthening the reviewing court's hand when the
agency's choice to proceed by ad hoc adjudication causes substantial
adverse consequences. This would seem to be the case if in instances
where a participant in an adjudicatory proceeding can demonstrate
resulting hardship, the agency may be judicially compelled to resort to
101. 94 S. Ct. at 1771.

102. Arguing that "[t]he Board must conduct a rule-making proceeding before discarding its
numerous precedents which hold that buyers are managerial employees," Bell Aerospace Company seriously questioned whether the flexibility of adjudicatory procedures is now necessary to
determine case-by-case which buyers are managerial employees. Brief for Bell Aerospace Co. at
16-17, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974):
The classification of buyers as managerial employees, and their resultant exclusion from
coverage under the Act, is not a problem which the NLRB could not reasonably foresee.
It is a fundamental issue that has arisen in numerous representation cases. Nor can the
Board be heard to say that it lacked sufficient experience with the issue to warrant
finalization into a formal rule. As the many Board decisions . . . demonstrate, the
NLRB has, on numerous occasions, analyzed the functions of buyers and has consistently found them to be a part of management. Similarly, the problem is not so
specialized "as to be impossible of capture into a general rule." In fact, the Board's
numerous precedents for more than a quarter of a century have distilled into a rule
relied upon by both labor and management-buyers, as managerial employees, are
excluded from the coverage of the Act. It is precisely this fact which makes the Board's
present, unilateral effort to drastically alter coverage under the Act so inappropriate.
The Board may need the flexibility to vary the application of a rule in particular factual
settings, but not its substantive content. There is a sequence of decisions which demonstrate that
for nearly three decades the Board applied rules of general applicability rather consistently in
representation cases to determine whether buyers were managerial employees. See Bell Aerospace
Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), and the Board's decisions in American Locomotive
Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115 (1950), and Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956), discussed in note 21
supra. See also note 17 supra. Hence, administrative flexibility need not be sacrificed if the
application of judicial power to compel an agency to conduct a rulemaking proceeding is carefully
limited to those situations in which an agency has demonstrated little need for flexibility.
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a rulemaking proceeding to announce a change in policy.10 3 Since the
Board's decision to accord representational rights to managerial
employees for the first time in Bell Aerospace Co. did not subject the
company to potential hardship, there was no need to require rulemaking, even though such a proceeding would have provided more information and an opportunity for greater participation in the policymaking process.

04

1

There is an important distinction in the Bell Aerospace decisions
between the approach of the Supreme Court and that of the court of
appeals in determining when a rulemaking proceeding is to be required of an administrative agency. The Supreme Court's decision
indicates that it will sanction judicially enforced compulsory rulemaking only when an agency has abused its discretion in proceeding by
adjudication. A determination of such an abuse depends upon a
finding that the action of the agency was in some manner or fashion
arbitrary, capricious or in excess of the agency's legal authority and,
thus, has inflicted harm on persons adversely affected by the agency's
action.' 0 5
The decision of the court of appeals, on the other hand, purports
to allow a reviewing court the authority to compel an agency to
conduct a rulemaking proceeding not merely when there has been an
abuse of discretion because the use of adjudicatory procedures
threatens to inflict harm upon the parties to the proposed adjudication,
but also whenever rulemaking is found to be more convenient than
adjudication, given the advantages of rulemaking. The court of appeals in Bell Aerospace held that an adjudicatory proceeding could not
be used to determine that buyers are not managerial employees and,
therefore, are covered by the NLRA because thousands of companies
and buyers would be affected by a change in policy and.because their
participation in the process of announcing new policy was deemed to
be advantageous to an informed decision by the Board. 10 6 Only a
rulemaking proceeding could provide a channel for the views of the
numerous persons likely to be affected by a change of policy.
The decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. allows an agency substantially greater procedural autonomy than
does the decision of the court of appeals. Under the court of appeals'
formulation, where the perceived advantages of proceeding by
103. Heretofore, if the Board was found to have abused its discretion in formulating an
order in an adjudication, the proper remedy was merely to refuse to enforce the order without
compelling it to conduct a rulemaking proceeding as an additional sanction. NLRB v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952), discussed in note 70 supra.
104. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1772 (1974); Bell Aerospace Co. v.
NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 497 (2d Cir. 1973).
105. The APA requires a court of review to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
106. 475 F.2d at 496-97.
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rulemaking are deemed to be substantial, a reviewing court may
substitute its judgment in place of the agency's exercise of discretion in
choosing between rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking may be
required when the court determines that the number of affected persons is large enough to raise the complexity of the policymaking
process beyond an adjudication's capacity to account for the variant
factors which should be considered. Whenever an agency is engaged in
formulating policy over matters having widespread effects, direct or
indirect, on numerous persons, a court of review may expand the
opportunity for participation beyond the immediate parties to the
proposed adjudication. Abuse of discretion as the standard for review
restricts the scope of review from the court of appeals' requirement of
a finding of comparative advantage between rulemaking and adjudication resulting from the opportunity in a rulemaking proceeding for the
participation of any interested person, to a specific finding of harm to
the parties to the adjudication resulting from the use of adjudicatory
procedures.
C.

Standards for Judicial Review of an Agency's
Choice Between Rulemaking
and Adjudication
The choice between rulemaking and adjudication cannot be easily
made by attempting to differentiate between the types of policy issues
which should be resolved through the articulation of a rule of general
applicability and those which are best suited to formulation through ad
hoc adjudication.
[T]here is the difficulty and importance of drawing a workable distinction between rulemaking and adjudication, for
analysis cannot proceed very far if the point of departure
itself lacks validity. The. language of the Administrative
Prodcedure Act is not much help; it first defines "rule"
broadly enough to cover virtually all agency action having
future effect and then defines "adjudication" as the process
leading up to everything else, "but including licensing." One
possible approach is not to affix a label to a proceeding as a
whole but to identify any aspect of it that declares generally
applicable policy as "rulemaking" and any aspect applying
that policy to identified persons as "adjudication." But this is
to define away the problem, for then all declarations of policy
in .any form of proceeding become "rulemaking." For purposes of deciding on what occasions a particular method of
policy formulation is suitable it is helpful to rely primarily on
the distinction that "rulemaking"-the process leading to the
issuance of regulations-is typically a proceeding that is entirely open ended in form, specifying only the class of persons
or practices that will come within its scope, while "adjudication" is a proceeding directed at least in part at determining
the legal status of persons who are named as parties, or of the
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acts or practices of those persons. Such an approach may be
unsatisfactory in many contexts, for by stressing one factor to
the exclusion of others it leaves some of the hardest questions
unresolved, may occasionally be inaccurate, and may permit
some formal agency actions to escape identification en-

tirely. 107
As long as the choice between proceeding by rulemaking or by adjudication is left to the informed discretion of the administrative agency,
defining rulemaking and distinguishing it from adjudication is a question for administrative solution. However, when the judiciary begins
to interfere with the agency's discretion to choose between proceeding
by rulemaking or by adjudication, the unsettled matter of classifying
policy issues as more appropriate for resolution through rulemaking
rather than adjudication may require judicial attention.
One reason that the Supreme Court refused in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. to countenance compulsory rulemaking in the absence
of an abuse of discretion is the lack of clearly definable standards
which a court can apply in order to determine whether policy should
be enunciated by formal rule or by ad hoc adjudication. A comparison
of the decisions of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in Bell
Aerospace reveals the dilemma in attempting to determine whether
rulemaking rather than adjudication is more appropriate for the resolution of a particular policy issue.
A determination can be made in an adjudication or in a rulemaking proceeding that buyers are not managerial employees and, accordingly, are within the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act.
How should a court determine whether the classification of buyers is
an issue better handled through the promulgation of a general rule
than through an adjudication of the facts of a particular representation
case? Judge Friendly did not find that the problem of classifying
buyers would require an adjudication in each instance in order to
determine their status as managerial employees. Rather, any representation case in which the Board reverses years of precedents in which
buyers have been classified as managerial employees, even though
binding only on the parties to the adjudication, takes on the character
of a general rule which is likely to have a broad radial effect on future
labor-management relations. Thus, Judge Friendly saw the policy
choice of whether buyers are to be treated as managerial employees as
being an issue which could only be resolved adequately with sufficient
information and inputs from all potentially affected parties seeking to
participate in a change of agency policy.
The Board was prescribing a new policy, not just with respect to 25 buyers in Wheatfield, N.Y., but in substance, to
use Mr. Justice Douglas' phrase, "to fit all cases at all times."
There must be tens of thousands of. manufacturing,
107. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 924.
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wholesale and retail units which employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter. Yet the Board did not even
attempt to inform industry and labor organizations, by means
providing some notice though not in conformity with section
4, of its proposed new policy and to invite comment thereon,
108
as it has sometimes done in the past ....
The issue is not in itself complex, but the policymaking choice is, given
the numerous interests likely to be affected by the Board's decision. 109
In an adjudication, the Board would be establishing a precedent
without an opportunity for participation by the thousands of companies and buyers whose interests in future adjudications might ultimately depend on the policy enunciated in -the prior one.
The same language which the court of appeals used to demonstrate the broad impact of one adjudication involving a significant
policymaking component affecting thousands of persons was quoted by
the Board to demonstrate the myriad factual situations in which
buyers are employed, thus calling for the particularized treatment
provided by adjudicatory procedures in the development of legal standards to be applied in any determination of the representational rights
of buyers.
In view of this large number of buyers in American Industry
and the fact that their duties vary from industry to industry,
company to company, and even among employees within the
same company, a proceeding which attempted to formulate
criteria to govern the entire class would be likely to produce
only broad general standards of little utility. It is doubtful
that a rule could be framed with sufficient particularity to
make clear which of the many thousands of buyers are
excluded from the coverage of the Act. Application in concrete cases would still necessitate recourse to the Board's
settled practice of deciding the applicability of the Act to
particular types of employees on a case-by-case basis.110
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. agreed with the
Board and held that the evidentiary types of issues likely to arise in a
representation case are so complex that the Board needs the flexibility
of adjudicatory procedures.'' Justice Powell placed special emphasis
upon the "specialized and varying" nature of the problems which the
NLRB confronts in determining whether one is a managerial
employee. 1 12 The factual makeup of the problem would not lend itself
108. 475 F.2d at 496.
109. For an analysis of the "polycentric" issue which is "characterized by a large number of
possible results and by the fact that many interests or groups will be affected by any solution
adopted," see Boyer, supra note 73, at 116-17.
110. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 31-32, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
111. 94 S. Ct. at 1771-72.
112. Id. at 1771, citing SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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to solution in a rulemaking proceeding. Whether a buyer is a managerial employee depends upon his actual job responsibilities, the amount
of discretion available in carrying out the employer's policies and the
3
buyer's relationship to management, "
The Board thus has reason to proceed with caution, developing its standards in a case-by-case manner with attention to
the specific character of the buyers' authority and duties in
each company."14
According to the Supreme Court, the status of buyers cannot be
determined en masse in a rulemaking proceeding.
The ease with which the subject matter complexity can be used as
the theoretical underpinning for either adjudicatory or rulemaking
procedures demonstrates that the distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication is not at all clear.'' 5 It is possible to argue, on the one
hand, that rulemaking is required when the parameters of a policy
choice in which a rule is to be enunciated extend beyond the context of
the particular factual situation in which a case arises. Alternatively,
when the agency must not only enunciate a rule but also apply the rule
by making findings of fact in a particular case, an argument can be
made that the complexity of the questions of fact precludes the formulation of a rule which purports to be applicable to all cases. Adjudicatory procedures may be necessary when an agency must engage in
detailed factfinding and also vary the rule as the facts change from
case to case. A general rule announced in a rulemaking proceeding
may provide less guidance than an adjudicatory decision if the rule has
numerous exceptions built into it. On the other side of the coin is the
possibility that a narrow rule promulgated in an adjudication can give
as much guidance to the agency and its constituency as a formal rule.
Moreover, if the rule is carefully drawn, it can be applied consistently.
Judge Friendly did not dispute that the possibility of requiring an
agency to conduct a rulemaking proceeding when it changes a longstanding rule or policy pronouncement having far-reaching effects on
the agency's constituency will invite judicial oversight of the use of
administrative procedures. Judge Friendly was in favor of watching
over an agency's use of procedures by expanding judicial review of
agency action to include the power to make a procedural choice
between rulemaking and adjudication for the agency when the advantages of proceeding by rulemaking rather than adjudication are perceived to be substantial.
There is an innovative aspect to Judge Friendly's approach in
reviewing an agency's choice of procedures. The dilemma in attempting to formulate concrete guidelines to be applied by courts in review113. 94 S. Ct. at 1769 n.19.
114. Id. at 1772.
115. See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 610-20.
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ing an agency's choice of procedures can be overlooked. However,
attention must not be centered on attempting to draw a definite distinction between rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures to determine
which set of procedures is right for the situation at hand. Instead, the
relevant inquiry must focus on the advantages of proceeding by
rulemaking.
The decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. stands for the proposition that as long as the agency does not use
its choice of procedures in a manner unfair to those whose justifiable
reliance upon past agency policy pronouncements subjects them to
potential harm, the methods used to promulgate rules of conduct
should not be given greater countenance than the substantive content
of the rule.' 16 Beyond the very narrow criteria for determining when
the use of adjudicatory procedures would be an abuse of discretion,
the Supreme Court questions whether there can be rules or standards
to determine judicially when an agency should be compelled to use one
procedure to the exclusion of the other. If Congress in enacting the
Administrative Procedure Act was not able to reach the degree of
specificity which would enable an agency clearly to delineate the types
of policymaking which call for either rulemaking or adjudication,
courts should not interfere, since to do so would merely replace administrative discretion in choosing procedures with judicial discretion
untempered by clearly enunciated standards of choice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The National Labor Relations Board has regained the authority to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication without close judicial
supervision. No doubt the Board will continue to dispose of most of its
business through ad hoc adjudication. Adjudication may indeed be the
better solution to many labor relations problems arising in the context
of an unfair labor practice or representation case.' ' 7 However, there is
a strong likelihood that rulemaking will be used more extensively by
116. See note 97 supra.
117. Judge Friendly was careful to note in Bell Aerospace that "policy making by adjudication often cannot be avoided in unfair labor practice cases, since the parties have already acted
and the Board must decide one way or the other," although he did not believe the same
considerations were applicable to representation cases. 475 F.2d at 496.
One commentator has put forth another reason that "adjudication will remain as the
overwhelmingly predominant procedure" for the Board:
[L]abor relations problems are better handled in an adjudicatory frame of reference, as
they have been for 34 years. Neither accident, nor the comfort of old ways, nor fear of
the unknown, accounts for this practice. In my judgment, while these factors may have
played some part, there are many good reasons for proceeding via case by case adjudication. Perhaps the best one is the "feel" for a problem, the understanding that comes,
when it is dealt with in the ambience of a live dispute between contesting parties in an
industrial community, even though the answer that emerges, directly attributable to
their controversy, transcends them and encompasses employees and employers in
many-perhaps all-other industrial communities. Is this not traditional adjudication in
which the judiciary has been long engaged? Is it not wise?
Statement of William Feldesman, Solicitor of the NLRB, BNA LAB. REL. Y.B. 166 (1969).
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the Board in the future.'
And, if the use of rulemaking procedures
has the pleasing effect of broadening the Board's perception of its
policy choices, the agency will have a more effective hand in charting
the direction of labor-management relations.
118. In a recent rulemaking proceeding in which the Board proposed to reverse "existing
case precedent" by declining jurisdiction over private secondary and elementary schools, 39 Fed.
Reg. 34081 (1974), Board Member Fanning, who expressed doubts about the correctness of the
proposed rule, requested interested parties to "address themselves to the question of the authority
of the Board to take the proposed action as well as to the question of the wisdom of such course
of action." 39 Fed. Reg. 34081-82 (1974). Subsequently, the Board issued the following statement
concerning the termination of the rulemaking proceeding:
On September 23, 1974, the Board published in the Federal Register ... a notice of
proposed rulemaking which solicited the views of educational institutions and associations, of labor organizations, and of the public as to whether or not to implement a
proposed rule ... declining, contrary to existing policies (see, e.g., The Windsor School,
Inc., 200 NLRB No. 163; Shattuck School, 189 NLRB 886), to assert jurisdiction over
private secondary, elementary, and preschool educational institutions. There were 39
responses to the notice. After careful consideration of all the responses, the Board has
decided not to adopt the proposed rule.
39 Fed. Reg. 43410 (1974).

